I always thought that the Red Chinese navy would be the "People's Liberation Navy." But no. It is technically called the "People's Liberation Army Navy," which sounds stupid. How am I supposed to feel scared or intimidated by a military force with such a stupid name? It's like calling your special ops force the "Fluffies." It also sounds like a contradiction in terms.
Which is how the term "Roman navy" has traditionally been treated. And, to an extent, understandably so. But as the article titled "Masters of the Mediterranean", again by Richard A. Gabriel, in the December issue of Military History made clear, this was not the case.
This is actually the best piece I have seen on the subject, not that there is much to choose from. For such a short piece, Gabriel takes a pretty comprehensive look at the Roman navy and even details three of the four major naval engagements of the Roman era, all during the Republic:
The Battle off Mount Economus (Gabriel's term; Polybius calls it the Battle of Ecnomus Promontory) in 256 BC where a Roman invasion fleet under the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus was able to break through and invade Carthaginian Africa (where they were defeated);
The Battle of the Gulf of Morbihan (technically not in the Mediterranean) in 56 BC, where Julius Caesar, facing a Gallic navy with immensely strong ships (made of oak) that were immune to ramming but had no oars, simply immobilized the fleet by using long, sharp hooks to pull down their halyards and sails;
The Battle of Actium in 31 BC, where Octavius Caesar (Octavian) defeated Roman and Ptolemaic Egyptian naval forces under Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) and Egyptian Queen Cleopatra VII Philopater (Cleopatra) to gain mastery of the Roman realm.
Oddly, Gabriel only mentions
en passant the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC, which actually ended the First Punic War in a victory for Rome.
A few particular struck me about this article. First was the sheer magnitude of Roman losses in the First Punic War -- 600 warships, 1,000 transports and 400,000 deaths -- due not to battle itself, but simply to rough seas. Sailing in antiquity was a dangerous endeavor, which was more dangerous for the Romans in the first Punic War by the advent of the
corvus ("Raven"), the rotating spiked plank which enabled the Romans to defeat the Carthaginians at sea but made their ships very unstable. Normally, ancient navies would stay close to shore, which was safer, but it also necessitated an army to protect them on land. The Athenians ignored this rule in the almost comical "battle" at
Aegospotami and lost the Peloponnesian War as a result.
More interesting to me is Gabriel's description of the Battle of Actium. Actium is shrouded in mystery. There is very, very little information in ancient sources about what actually happened during the engagement between Octavius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra. The most famous feature was Cleopatra's squadron fleeing the battle in the middle of it. The result was William Shakespeare's romanticized account of it, which appears to have little basis in reality, aside from Cleopatra's flight.
What we do know is that Antony, with his ally Cleopatra, planned to take on Octavius for mastery of Rome. Their objective was an invasion of Italy itself. Their primary asset was a very large navy, a Roman outfit built around the cadre of the Egyptian navy, which was apparently considered very, very good by ancient standards. Antony had his army as well. He was a war hero, a popular figure in Rome.
Octavius, meanwhile was facing riots due to the high taxes he had to impose to built his own military machine to fight Antony and Cleopatra. He was a politician who had no military experience, but he had Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, a brilliant Roman commander in the tradition of Julius Caesar, and he delegated military matters to him.
This is where it gets a little mysterious. Antony moved his fleet and troops from his main base in Alexandria to the Ambracian Gulf in northwest Greece. Why? No one knows. As best I can figure, it was isolated, so Octavius would have difficulty monitoring his movements, and close to Italy, so Antony could move his invasion force across the Adriatic quickly.
But it was more than just isolated, it was hot, malarial and pretty desolate. An army and navy of the size Antony had was going to have an extremely difficult time supplying itself with forage from the Ambracian Gulf region. Antony would have to supply the troops from outside the gulf region, except the gulf's isolation meant that he could not use the normal Greek ports such as Corinth and bring the supplies overland. He set up a network of naval bases to shuttle supplies up from Egypt for his forces.
That network would prove to be his undoing. Agrippa seized one of those bases, at the Greek port of Methone, during the summer of 31 BC. Antony and his troops were now cut off. Worse for him, while Antony was distracted by the loss of his supply base at Methone, Agrippa landed Octavian's fleet and troops just outside the Ambracian Gulf, across from the peninsula of Actium (which, in another mystery, has since been renamed
La Punta). Agrippa set up camp in a strong defensive position on the heights overlooking the Ambracian Gulf.
By just these two acts, his campaign to rule Rome had become an unmitigated disaster for Antony. His troops and fleet were now cut off from supplies, in a hot, humid and desolate part of Greece prone to malaria and other diseases, and vulnerable to parasites that had the unpleasant side effect of eating the wood his ships. His fleet was blockaded in the Gulf by Agrippa's forces, sustained at his nearby anchorage. Antony could not drive them from the anchorage because the defenses of the heights were too strong, and Agrippa refused to give battle with his land forces. Agrippa was well prepared; all Agrippa had to do was wait for Antony to make the move everyone knew was coming.
Meanwhile, Octavius solidified his political position at the expense of Antony. The Roman declaration of war was against Cleopatra, not Antony, so Antony's alliance with her was thereby branded as treasonous. A good part of Antony's support in the Roman Senate was thus stripped. Much of what remained was driven off by what was perceived to be the arrogance of Cleopatra.
That summer, disease and desertions wracked Antony's forces, his political support eroded to the point where Octavius (one of the master politicians in all of history) now had a commanding advantage, and Agrippa tightened the noose around Anthony's Actium position by seizure of Levkas and other areas.
The Battle of Actium was thus already decided before it was fought on September 2, 31 BC. Antony and Cleopatra had lost. What remained was simply to see how much they could salvage.
Antony's fleet had been reduced from its high of about 500 that summer to now some 200 ships, with 20,000 marines and 2,000 archers. Most of these ships were large quinquerimes and even several deciremes. Included in this force was a 60-ship Egyptian squadron, containing Cleopatra and the pay for Antony's troops, which operated behind the main battle line and apparently took no part in the actual fighting. One facet Gabriel does not mention is that Antony's ships all had their sails stowed onboard; sails were normally left ashore when battle was expected, as they were only useful for long voyages and were a liability in battle. This nugget is suggestive of an attempt to break out and escape from the trap Actium had become.
Agrippa had some 400 ships with 16,000 marines and 3,000 archers. These were mostly smaller
liburnae -- biremes. The desertions among Antony's forces may have resulted in Antony's battle plan
falling into Agrippa's hands. Antony apparently planned to use the archers and catapults on his towering ships to sweep the man from the decks of Agrippa's ships, then seize the smaller biremes with grappling irons fired from catapults or
ballistae and board them with his marines. Agrippa had other ideas.
As I noted earlier, the details of the battle are extremely sketchy from ancient sources. According to
Montagu, Plutarch says that Agrippa's right wing "backed water" (backed up) to lure Antony's left wing forward, and then Agrippa executed an outflanking movement. Since I don't yet have a copy of Plutarch's story of Antony, I can't confirm that. But it is not inconsistent with Gabriel's version.
Agrippa appears to have backed water, either to lure Antony from the land protections of the Actium promontory, to keep out of range of Antony's missiles, or both. He then tried to outflank Antony, or at least feigned doing to. Antony was forced to extend his line to prevent being outflanked, possibly reaching back to the coast at Actium. In doing so, he increased the distance between each of his ships.
This was the opening Agrippa had been looking for. With the distance between Antony's ships opening, their ability for mutual support was correspondingly reduced. Agrippa then sent his smaller, more maneuverable biremes in to attack Antony's larger, more ponderous ships. The preferred tactic here was to have several of Agrippa's biremes attack each of Antony's larger ships.
The biremes would come in, evading Antony's grappling attempts, and sheer off the oars of Antony's ships, immobilizing them. In other instances the biremes would ram their larger targets and back away, again evading the grappling irons. Much of Antony's fleet was immobilized this way. Instead of boarding the immobilized ships, Agrippa had them torched with flammables launched from his own catapults and
ballistae.
Seeing the battle was not going well, Cleopatra's squadron at the first opportunity hoisted their sails and fled for Egypt. Antony soon followed. The remaining ships, demoralized by both their losses and the flight of their commander, surrendered to Octavius.
Antony's army never made it back to Egypt, but surrendered to Octavius as well.
Like I said, Gabriel's article touches on a rarely discussed subject. I need to explore it further.